{"id":823,"date":"2018-05-17T14:50:58","date_gmt":"2018-05-17T14:50:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/?p=823"},"modified":"2023-03-19T10:32:02","modified_gmt":"2023-03-19T10:32:02","slug":"performance-spectatorship-acting-without-acting","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/performance-spectatorship-acting-without-acting\/","title":{"rendered":"Performance Spectatorship: \u201cActing Without Acting\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

Evi Prousali<\/strong>*<\/a><\/p>\n

Abstract: <\/strong>Various theoretical approaches have been proposed in order to verify the way by which the spectator perceives a performance. Nowadays, neurophysiology along with cognitive neuroscience offer new tools which enable performance theorists to embark on research into the spectator\u2019s receptive procedure. The article highlights the significant aspects of the current scientific evidence that explain theatre spectatorship at a primal level, showing that sensation constitutes the basis of spectator\u2019s empathy. The above mentioned scientific findings supplement the Theory of Theatre with experimental data on spectatorship.<\/p>\n

Keywords<\/strong>: Spectatorship, theory of theatre, neuroscience\/cognitive sciences, mirror neurons, empathy<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In the late twentieth century, a number of important theatre theorists have drawn attention to the significance of the sensory element<\/em> in the spectator\u2019s perception of performance. In their publications, they introduced a concept of spectatorship which moved away from interpretation<\/em>, towards a primarily sensory<\/em> perception. From a different perspective, neuroscience has also turned its interest on the broader issue of \u201cspectatorship\u201d and, through a number of experimental investigations carried out by innovative neuroscientists and those engaged in the cognitive sciences, has reached similar conclusions concerning the process of perception and action-understanding. In many ways, these findings have come to vindicate the assertions of the theatre theorists and make contributions, with crucial neurophysiological evidence, to the study of performance-perception.<\/p>\n

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Brain mapping<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
Spectatorship and Theory of Theatre<\/strong><\/h5>\n

It is only lately that the issue of spectatorship has been brought back to the epicentre of theatre studies. The unanswered questions about \u201chow spectators make sense or interact with the actor\u201d attracted, once again, the interest of theatre theorists. It was not until the 1980s that new theoretical approaches, concerning performance spectatorship, reappeared in the discourse on Theory of Theatre.<\/p>\n

Until then, due to the prevalence of Saussurean semiotics, the signifier-signified model had ignored the third indispensable element in theatre-signification: the interpretant\u2014which, evidently, was given apt attention by Charles Peirce. Indeed, Peirce builds reception directly into his famous definition of a sign as \u201csomething<\/em> which stands to somebody<\/em> for something<\/em> in some respect or capacity\u201d (Peirce 1932, 2: 228). Peirce\u2019s assertion establishes the interpretant as an equal co-factor of signification that further enriches the field of semiosis, with an individualized parameter, besides the socio-historical one.<\/p>\n

Initially, the first generation of modern theatre semioticians had paid less attention to the audience’s contribution in signification, a fact demonstrated by Keir Elam\u2019s book which \u201cdevotes only nine of its 210 pages to this subject\u201d (Carlson 1993: 507). Theatre theorists realized that they had to move beyond a mere structural analysis of \u201csigns\u201d and develop a \u201cpragmatics\u201d of performance-communication, embracing the historical and sociological context of both<\/em> stage realization and<\/em> reception (Fischer-Lichte 1992).<\/p>\n

Various theorists contributed to this distinct turn in the approach to spectatorship as a whole. Patrice Pavis was the first among them who not only inclined towards a new approach to theatrical experience, but also suggested a variety of strategies for analyzing audience\u2019s perception (Pavis 1982: 9). In this way, the issue of \u201chow\u201d spectators perceive a performance was gradually reintroduced.<\/p>\n

The traditional concepts according to which the spectator is oscillating between identification<\/em> and estrangement<\/em> were too narrow to cover the complexity of performance-perception. Instead, new approaches emerged concerning the spectator\u2019s perception: Anne Ubersfeld, influenced by the Lacanian theory, posited that the performance audience is implicated in an \u201ceternally unfulfilled desire of the primal Other<\/em>,\u201d giving priority to the spectator\u2019s unconscious (Ubersfeld 1981: 303); Andre Helbo referred to the \u201cmutual work of actor and audience in weaving patterns of energies<\/em>\u201d (Helbo 1982: 103); an almost identical proposition is made by Josette Feral who advocates that the actor is \u201cthe point of passage for energy flow\u2014gestural, vocal, libidinal, etc.\u201d (Feral 1982: 174, 177); Michael Kirby, in an attempt to demystify the spectator\/actor interrelation, claims that the audience does not seek to \u201cde-code\u201d the performance, but has a \u201cprimarily sensory\u201d experience \u201cdealing with relationships on the perceptual continuum of vision and hearing\u201d (Kirby 1982: 110).<\/p>\n

Expectedly, moderate and reconciling approaches were also proposed, such as that of Bert States who suggested a binary view which rescues the \u201ccargo of meanings\u201d on stage, while emphasizing \u201cthe perceptual impression theatre makes on the spectator\u201d (States 1985: 6-8). In general, the majority of theatre theorists distanced themselves from what, by that time, was the widely-accepted notion of de-codification of the performance, towards a more primal and naturalistic consideration of the interactions between stage and audience.<\/p>\n

Consequently, the tension between theatre as \u201ccommunication\u201d\u2014that is, spectators\u2019 interpretation\u2014and theatre as site of energy flows\u2014referring to spectators\u2019 sensory perception\u2014was showing signs of attenuation. Sensation was seemingly winning the game over interpretation.<\/p>\n

Of course, there were also composite voices, such as that of Herbert Blau, the eminent poststructuralist who, while favouring performance as a realm of libidinal flow and desire, rejected the view that performance perception could be uncontaminated by the process of codification: \u201cThere is nothing more illusory in performance than the illusion of the unmediated\u201d (Blau 1983: 143). In other words, for him, spectatorship could never be unmediated.<\/p>\n

A few years later, Blau posited that the audience \u201cdoes not exist before the play but is initiated or precipitated by it\u201d and that the audience observes not only the performance but \u201citself\u201d as well; therefore, the theatre audience is an entity whose consciousness is constructed during performance and \u201cunfolds in response,\u201d posing questions about \u201cmemory, mirroring, perspective and the spatializing of thought itself\u201d (Blau 1990: 25-6). Apparently, this shift in the issue of spectatorship from interpretation towards sensation was also brought about under the influence of Maurice Merleau-Ponty\u2019s ideas which radically changed the approach to \u201cembodiment\u201d and the structure of experience in the second half of the twentieth century.<\/p>\n

Spectatorship and Neuroscience<\/strong><\/h5>\n

In the early 1990s, new discoveries in the field of Neuroscience came to consolidate the validity of the above theoretical assumptions about \u201csensation\u201d being at the core of spectators\u2019 perception. The new field of Neuroaesthetics\u2014introduced by the neuroscientist Semir Zeki\u2014along with the discovery of the Mirror Neuron System (MNs) in the brain\u2014by neurophysiologist Giacomo Rizzolatti\u2014enhanced the relations between Art and Neuroscience (Zeki 1999; Rizzolatti 2004).<\/p>\n

On the one hand, Zeki revealed that visual perception consists of a plurality of visual consciousnesses that are asynchronous to each other. Since art is mostly based on visual stimuli, Zeki soon engaged his research with art and with aesthetic perception, in order to detect what happens in the brain when we experience art<\/em> (Zeki 1999). In the same spirit, other neuroscientists also addressed new problems related to aesthetics, employing brain-imaging techniques (such as, fMRI, EEG, MEG)[1]<\/sup><\/a> in order to investigate the concept of aesthetic pleasure (Vessel 2012) or aesthetic appraisal (positive or negative) (Ishizu 2011).<\/p>\n

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Cortical brain activity associated with aesthetic appreciation. Dahlia W. Zaidel et al. (2013)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In the majority of these neuroimaging experiments, the observers\/spectators were presented with paintings, music or photos, inside an fMRI scanner, in order to detect the brain regions activated while experiencing art. The results revealed that brain neural structures correlated with sensations, emotions, and meaning, each with different neural underpinnings.[2]<\/sup><\/a> The neural mechanism interrelating sensations, emotions and meaning has not, as yet, been fully elucidated. Sensations correspond to the first neural level of perception, which may also encompass very quick quantitative changes in physiological attributes, such as: changes in pupil size, heart rate, and skin conductance. Sensations are intensified by the arousal of emotions\u2014to the creation of which the mechanism of memories is probably involved.<\/p>\n

Emotional experience disperses on different levels\u2014the highest level being the one in which emotions and cognitive systems interact (Roseman 2004). Moreover, the experiments revealed that art-appraisal evokes almost the same rewarding neural circuits as do food and sex and that art-perception is also biased by expertise and personality (Chatterjee 2014: 184-5). Thus, neuroaesthetic evidence purveys the notion that art-perception is primarily sensorial.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, Giacomo Rizzolatti and his colleagues, in a number of neurophysiological experiments, have found that, when an individual observes another individual perform an action (for instance, grasping an object), specific neural regions (MNs) are activated in the spectator\u2019s brain, as if the spectator was performing the action himself\/herself, but without any overt motor action taking place.<\/p>\n

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Mirror Neuron System (MNs). Brain regions activated during action observation<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

These results reveal the existence of a functional brain mechanism through which \u201cthe actions, emotions or sensations we see<\/em> as social stimuli, activate our own internal representations of the body states, as if we were engaged in a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation\u201d (Freedberg 2007: 198). Rizzolatti further describes action-observation as \u201ca first-person process, where the self feels like an actor, rather than a spectator\u201d (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010). Consequently, the observer of actions or emotions is virtually \u201cacting without acting.\u201d This neural simulation in the brain\u2014or else, the \u201cinternal representation\u201d of the observed action\u2014is, probably, the mechanism by which the observer perceives and makes sense of observed actions. Neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese described the phenomenon with the term \u201cembodied simulation.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"\"
\u201cMotion, Emotion and Empathy in Aesthetic Experience. An fMRI Study of the Brain Regions Activated,\u201d by Vittorio Gallese et al (2007)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Taking his research further he included artworks\u2014paintings and sculptures\u2014that represent<\/em> actions and deployed appropriate experiments so as to investigate their aesthetic perception. Gallese concluded that \u201ca crucial element of aesthetic response<\/em> consists of the activation of embodied mechanisms,\u201d meaning neural activations, \u201cencompassing the simulation of actions, emotions and corporeal sensation, and that these mechanisms are universal\u201d (Freedberg and Gallese 2007: 197).<\/p>\n

\"\"
Embodied simulation in aesthetic experience: The gestures of the artists that are only implicit in the marks on canvas are \u201ccorporeally\u201d felt by the spectators; a. Jackson Pollock. Number 14: Gray (1948), b. Lucio Fontana. Concetto Spaziale \u201cWaiting\u201d (1960)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

It appears, then, that the aesthetic experience of artworks is based on the same pre-conscious and spontaneous brain neural mechanism as the one described by the \u201cembodiment\u201d rule. Additionally, similar findings also apply in the case of language-understanding. A relatively recent review of neuroscience results (Buccino 2016) concerning linguistic meaning showed that an activation of the hand motor <\/em>neural area occurs during the processing of sentences expressing a transfer action, for both concrete nouns (for example, \u201cI give you some pizza<\/em>\u201d) as well as abstract ones (for example, \u201cI give you my opinion<\/em>\u201d) (Glenberg 2008). The available empirical evidence seems to suggest that even words<\/em> can activate specific sensorimotor areas in the brain. Word-articulation seems to provoke, primarily, an \u201cembodied simulation\u201d (that is, activation of somatosensory neural circuits) in an individual\u2019s brain in order to ascribe meaning. A finding which also stresses the fundamental role which \u201cembodied simulation\u201d plays in speaker-listener\u2019s communication.<\/p>\n

Thus, apart from observed actions, certain classes of words are also being understood through sensory processes. Conclusively, the above neuroscience data prove that an individual\u2019s primary response to visual and auditory stimuli is mainly based on the unconscious activation of the brain neural circuits by which the observed actions are simulated. This \u201cembodied simulation\u201d corresponds to the sensory process of the spectator\u2019s action-understanding which is generally referred to as empathic (Freedberg and Gallese 2007: 198).[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

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The main parts of the Brain<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Empathy is a concept difficult to define (Titchener 2014). On the whole, it is considered to be the sharing of the other\u2019s affective state, consisting of a complex neurophysiologic and psychological mechanism towards \u201cemotion identification and affect sharing\u201d (Coll 2017). Nevertheless, according to neurophysiology, the primary processing steps towards empathizing involve the embodied simulation. Similar terms, such as \u201cembodied mind\u201d and \u201cempathetic projection\u201d are foundational concepts in the cognitive sciences and are attributed to empathic situations. Hence, a solid framework concerning the issue of empathy is created in which scientific data (MNs) and empirically tested insights (cognitive results) converge (Iacoboni 2009: 654). Within this framework, the assertion that empathy is the \u201cproduct\u201d of an undoubtedly embodied experience is well founded.<\/p>\n

Towards an Interdisciplinary Research on Spectatorship<\/strong><\/h5>\n

How, then, could the above-mentioned neurophysiological results concerning empathy be incorporated in the discourse on theatre spectatorship? Since the audience\u2019s perception of a performance is, foremost, based on action-observation and auditory stimuli, actor and spectator communicate according to the above-mentioned sensory process of empathy. Thus, their inter-action is embodied\u2014that is, empathic\u2014and not primarily interpretive.<\/p>\n

Significant assumptions by theatre theorists\u2014such as Helbo\u2019s and Feral\u2019s, which moved away from the interpretive model and adopted the energy flows, or Blau\u2019s audience which observes not only the performance but itself<\/em> as well\u2014seem to have intuitively captured the inner nature of empathy. Accordingly, theatre theorists name empathy as one of performance imperatives, being undoubtedly at the core of spectators\u2019 perception. Bruce McConachie says \u201cempathy is crucial for spectators attempting to negotiate and understand both the theatrical and the dramatic levels of all performances\u201d (McConachie 2013: 191), while Patrice Pavis defines empathy in a more sophisticated manner: \u201cthe audience embodies actors\u201d (Pavis 2014: 8).<\/p>\n

In the light of the above-mentioned experimental data, the performance spectator finds himself\/herself in an \u201cacting without acting\u201d situation, as he\/she is unconsciously simulating the performed actions\u2014as well as words\u2014in his\/her brain. The alleged passivity of the spectator should, therefore, be abandoned since it is experimentally groundless. The shift of priority from semantics to sensation is becoming increasingly justified.<\/p>\n

Of course, more research is still required in order to dissect all phases involved in spectators\u2019 perception\u2014beginning with empathy, progressing with emotion-creation and leading, eventually, to the ascription of meaning. Personal parameters (for example, educational, sociological and historical factors), which the scientific research takes into account, seem to have an influence on the extent, the degree as well as mode of empathy developed. After all, it is generally accepted that performance perception is greatly individualized, leading to a variety of responses by spectators.<\/p>\n

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Neuroaesthetics Review, an Explanatory Model of Aesthetic Experience, by Anjan Chatterjee et al. (2014)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The fact is that theorists of theatre had intuitively stressed the central role which sensation plays in spectatorship at least one decade before neuroscientists begun to investigate spectatorship thoroughly; not to mention Antonin Artaud who envisioned it more than half a century ago:<\/p>\n

In the theatre, poetry and science must, henceforth, be identical. Every emotion has organic bases. To know in advance what points of the body to touch is the key to throwing the spectator into magical trances. And it is this invaluable kind of science that poetry in the theatre has been without for a long time (Artaud 1958: 140).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Artaud is proven to be prescient and precise:<\/p>\n

[T]he separation between the analytic theatre and the plastic world seems to us a stupidity. One does not separate the mind from the body nor the senses from the intelligence (86). . . .  Whereas, in the digestive theatre of today, the nerves, that is to say a certain physiological sensitivity, are deliberately left aside, abandoned \u2026 Theatre of Cruelty intends to reassert all the time-tested magical means of capturing the sensibility (125-6).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

To my knowledge, there are only few scientific experiments directly involved with theatre spectatorship, partly, due to technological difficulties and, partly, due to the inadequate contact between the disciplines of theatre and neuroscience. It is about time that theatre theorists, artists and neuroscientists form an interdisciplinary research platform on an issue of their common interest: spectatorship.<\/p>\n

Consequently, it seems certain that theorists of theatre can fertilize neuroscience with their imagination, vision and intuition. The cross-fertilization between Theory of Theatre, Neuroscience and Cognitive Sciences shall be to their mutual benefit. Theatre performance, being the only artistic medium that embraces all aspects of human behavior, stands out as the most appropriate \u201claboratory\u201d for the investigation of aesthetic perception, as well as action- and intention-understanding; for the same reason it is a model field for making assumptions on social understanding, inter-subjectivity and in positing plausible approaches on human mental processing.<\/p>\n

From their part, theorists of theatre, as Jill Dolan argues, should \u201ckeep changing their seat in the theatre, and . . . continually ask: How does it look from over there<\/em>?\u201d[4]<\/sup><\/a> in order to reflect upon their own ideas and elucidate their concepts. Apparently, there is need for more sophisticated experiments which could be designed on the basis of such an interdisciplinary collaboration. To this end, a new symbiotic<\/em> model should be proposed. After all, the brain has been proven to be the \u201ctheatre of consciousness.\u201d<\/p>\n

\n
Endnotes<\/strong><\/h5>\n

\n[1]<\/a> fMR\u0399: functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, EEG: Electroencephalography, MEG: Magnetoencephalography.
\n[2]<\/a> In relation to sensations<\/em>, see Chatterjee 2004; in relation to emotions<\/em>, see Biederman 2006; in relation to meaning<\/em>, see Kirk, et al. 2009.
\n[3]<\/a> Gallese explains that \u201cembodied simulation\u201d in aesthetic experience is, for example, \u201cempathy for pain. The viewing of images of punctured or damaged body parts activates part of the same network of brain centers that are normally activated by our own sensation of pain.\u201d
\n[4]<\/a> Jill Dolan, 1989, as quoted in Carlson, 1993: 540.<\/p>\n

\n
Works Cited<\/strong><\/h5>\n

Artaud, Antonin. The<\/em> Theatre and its Double<\/em>. Trans. Mary Caroline Richards. Grove Press, New York, 1958.<\/p>\n

Biederman, I., and E. A. Vessel. \u201cPerceptual Pleasure and the Brain.\u201d American Scientist<\/em> 94 (2006): 249-55.<\/p>\n

Blau, Herbert. \u201cUniversals of Performance; or, Amortizing Play.\u201d Sub-stance <\/em>37-8 (1983).<\/p>\n

\u2014. The Audience. <\/em>Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.<\/p>\n

Buccino, Giovanni, Ivan Colag\u00e8, Nicola Gobbi, and Giorgio Bonaccorso. \u201cGrounding Meaning in Experience: A Broad Perspective on Embodied Language.\u201d Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews<\/em>, 2016. http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1016\/j.neubiorev.2016.07.033<\/a><\/p>\n

Carlson, Marvin. Theories of the Theatre:<\/em> A Historical and Critical Survey,<\/em> from the Greeks to the Present<\/em>. Ithaca\/New York: Cornell University Press, 1993.<\/p>\n

Chatterjee, A. \u201cProspects for a Cognitive Neuroscience of Visual Aesthetics.\u201d Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts <\/em>4.2 (2004): 55-60.<\/p>\n

\u2014. Aesthetic Brain<\/em>: How We Evolved to Desire Beauty and Enjoy Art<\/em>. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014.<\/p>\n

Coll, Michel-Pierre, Essi Viding, Markus R\u00fctgen, Giorgia Silani, Claus Lamm, Caroline Catmur, and Geoffrey Bird. \u201cAre we Really Measuring Empathy? Proposal for a New Measurement Framework.\u201d Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews<\/em> 83 (December 2017): 132-9.<\/p>\n

Dolan, Jill. \u201cIn Defense of the Discourse: Materialist Feminism, Postmodernism, Poststructuralism and Theory.\u201d TDR <\/em>33 (1989) 58-71.<\/p>\n

Elam, Keir. The <\/em>Semiotics of Theatre and Drama<\/em>. London: M<\/em>ethuen, <\/em>1980<\/em>.<\/em><\/p>\n

Feral, Josette. \u201cPerformance and Theatricality: The Subject Demystified.\u201d Modern Drama<\/em> 25.1 (March 1982): 170-81.<\/p>\n

Fischer-Lichte, Erika. \u201cSense and Sensation: Exploring the Interplay between the Semiotic and Performative Dimensions of Theatre.\u201d Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism<\/em> 22.2 (2008): 69-81.<\/p>\n

\u2014. The Semiotics of Theatre. <\/em>Trans. Jeremy Gaines and Doris L. Jones. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.<\/p>\n

Freedberg, David, and Vittorio Gallese. \u201cMotion, Emotion and Empathy in Aesthetic Experience.\u201d TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences<\/em> 11.5 (2007): 197-203.<\/p>\n

Glenberg, A.M., M. Sato, L. Cattaneo, L. Riggio, D. Palumbo, and G. Buccino. \u201cProcessing Abstract Language Modulates Motor System Activity.\u201d Q.J. Exp. Psychol<\/em>. 61 (2008) : 905-19.<\/p>\n

Helbo, Andre. \u201cProblemes d’une rhetorique scenique.\u201d Theatre Semiotics. <\/em>Ed. Ernest W. B. Hess-Liittich. Tubingen, 1982.<\/p>\n

Iacoboni, Marco. \u201cImitation, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons.\u201d Annual Review of Psychology<\/em> 60 (2009): 653-70.<\/p>\n

Ishizu, Tomohiro, and S. Zeki. \u201cToward a Brain-Based Theory of Beauty.\u201d PLoS ONE<\/em> 6.7: e21852. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1371\/journal.pone.0021852<\/a>, 2011.<\/p>\n

Kirby, Michael. \u201cNonsemiotic Performance.\u201d Modern <\/em>Drama<\/em> 25.1 (March 1982): 105-11.<\/p>\n

Kirk, U, et al. \u201cModulation of Aesthetic Value by Semantic Context: An fMRI Study.\u201d Neuroimage <\/em>44.3 (2009): 1125-32.<\/p>\n

McConachie, Bruce. \u201cIntroduction: Spectating as Sandbox Play.\u201d Affective Performance and Cognitive Science. Body, Brain and Being<\/em>. Ed. Nicola Shaughnessy. Bloomsbury, 2013. 183-97.<\/p>\n

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nologie de la perception<\/em>. Gallimard, Paris, 1945.<\/p>\n

Pavis, Patrice. Introduction. \u201cA Few Improvised and Provisory Thoughts on Acting Today.\u201d Acting Reconsidered: New Approaches to Actor\u2019s Work: A Collection of Scientific Articles<\/em>. Lithuanian Music and Theatre Academy, 2014.<\/p>\n

\u2014. Languages of the Stage: Essays in the Semiology of the Theatre. <\/em>Trans. Susan Melrose et al., New York: Performing Arts Journal Publication, 1982.<\/p>\n

Peirce, Charles. Collected Papers. <\/em>Vol.2, Cambridge, Mass., 1932.<\/p>\n

Rizzolatti, G., and C. Sinigaglia. \u201cThe Functional Role of the Parieto-Frontal Mirror Circuit: Interpretations and Misinterpretations.\u201d Nature Reviews Neuroscience <\/em>11.4. 264-74.<\/p>\n

Rizzolatti, Giacomo. \u201cThe Mirror-neuron System and Imitation.\u201d Perspectives on Imitation: From Mirror Neurons to Memes<\/em>. Ed. S. Hurley and N. Chater. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2004.<\/p>\n

Roseman, I., Evdokas, A. \u201cAppraisals Cause Experienced Emotions: Experimental Evidence.\u201d Cognition and Emotion <\/em>18.1 (2004): 1-28.<\/p>\n

States, Bert O. Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: <\/em>On the Phenomenology of Theater. <\/em>Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.<\/p>\n

Titchener, Edward Bradford. \u201cIntrospection and Empathy.\u201d DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI, <\/em>7.1 (2014): 25-30. http:\/\/www.crossingdialogues.com\/Ms-E14-01.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

Ubersfeld, Anne. L’\u00e9cole du spectateur, Lire le th\u00e9\u00e2tre 2<\/em>. Paris: Editions sociales, 1981.<\/p>\n

Vessel, Edward A., G. Gabrielle Starr, and Nava Rubin. \u201cThe Brain on Art: Intense Aesthetic Experience Activates the Default Mode Network.\u201d Frontiers in Human Neuroscience<\/em> 6.66 (2012).  https:\/\/www.frontiersin.org\/articles\/10.3389\/fnhum.2012.00066\/full<\/a><\/p>\n

Zeki, Semir. Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain. <\/em>New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

*<\/a>Evi Prousali<\/strong> is a PhD holder in Theatre Studies (2010). Presently, she is Adjunct Lecturer (Faculty of Theatre Studies, University of Athens) teaching \u201cContemporary Theatre Performance\u201d and completing a Post Doctorate on \u201cTheatre Perception and Neuroscience.\u201d She also has a BSc. in Chemistry (1990) and a post-graduate research degree in molecular biology (Pasteur Institute of Athens). She is a member of the Hellenic Association of Theatre and Performing Arts Critics and of the Greek Philosophical Society (2011). She has published several papers on theatre performance and has participated in a number of conferences.<\/p>\n

Copyright \u00a9<\/strong> 2018 Evi Prousali
\nCritical Stages\/Sc\u00e8nes critiques<\/em> e-ISSN: 2409-7411<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

This work is licensed under the
\nCreative Commons Attribution International License CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Evi Prousali* Abstract: Various theoretical approaches have been proposed in order to verify the way by which the spectator perceives a performance. Nowadays, neurophysiology along with cognitive neuroscience offer new tools which enable performance theorists to embark on research into the<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":830,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[9],"tags":[56],"class_list":["post-823","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-special-topic","tag-by-evi-prousali","","tg-column-two"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/18\/2018\/06\/Prousali-7.jpg?fit=700%2C469&ssl=1","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p9Xk3S-dh","jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/823","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=823"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/823\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1565,"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/823\/revisions\/1565"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/830"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=823"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=823"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.critical-stages.org\/17\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=823"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}